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Abstract
Coordinated campaigns are used to influence and manipulate
social media platforms and their users, a critical challenge to
the free exchange of information online. Here we introduce
a general network-based framework to uncover groups of ac-
counts that are likely coordinated. The proposed method con-
struct coordination networks based on arbitrary behavioral
traces shared among accounts. We present five case studies
of influence campaigns in the diverse contexts of U.S. elec-
tions, Hong Kong protests, the Syrian civil war, and cryp-
tocurrencies. In each of these cases, we detect networks of
coordinated Twitter accounts by examining their identities,
images, hashtag sequences, retweets, and temporal patterns.
The proposed framework proves to be broadly applicable to
uncover different kinds of coordination across information
warfare scenarios.
Introduction
Online social media have revolutionized how people access
news and information, and form opinions. By enabling ex-
changes that are unhindered by geographical barriers, and
by lowering the cost of information production and con-
sumption, social media have enormously broadened partici-
pation in civil and political discourse. Although this could
potentially strengthen democratic processes, there is in-
creasing evidence of malicious actors polluting the informa-
tion ecosystem with disinformation and manipulation cam-
paigns (Lazer et al. 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018;
Bessi and Ferrara 2016; Shao et al. 2018; Ferrara 2017;
Stella, Ferrara, and De Domenico 2018; Deb et al. 2019;
Bovet and Makse 2019; Grinberg et al. 2019).
While influence campaigns, misinformation, and propa-
ganda have always existed (Jowett and O’Donnell 2018),
social media have created new vulnerabilities and abuse op-
portunities. Just as easily as like-minded users can connect
in support of legitimate causes, so can groups with fringe,
conspiratorial, or extremist beliefs reach critical mass and
become impervious to expert or moderating views. Plat-
form APIs and commoditized fake accounts make it sim-
ple to develop software to impersonate users and hide the
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identity of those who control these social bots — whether
they are fraudsters pushing spam, political operatives am-
plifying misleading narratives, or nation-states waging on-
line warfare (Ferrara et al. 2016). Cognitive and social bi-
ases make us even more vulnerable to manipulation by
social bots: our limited attention facilitates the spread of
unchecked claims, confirmation bias makes us disregard
facts, group-think and echo chambers distort perceptions
of norms, and the bandwagon effect makes us pay atten-
tion to bot-amplified memes (Weng et al. 2012; Hills 2019;
Ciampaglia et al. 2018; Lazer et al. 2018).
Despite advances in countermeasures such as machine
learning algorithms and human fact-checkers employed by
social media platforms to detect misinformation and inau-
thentic accounts, malicious actors continue to effectively de-
ceive the public, amplify misinformation, and drive polar-
ization (Barrett 2019). We observe an arms race in which
the sophistication of attacks evolves to evade detection.
Most machine learning tools to combat online abuse tar-
get the detection of social bots, and mainly use meth-
ods that focus on individual accounts (Davis et al. 2016;
Varol et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019). However, malicious
groups may employ coordination tactics that appear innocu-
ous at the individual level, and whose suspicious behaviors
can be detected only when observing networks of interac-
tions among accounts. For instance, an account changing its
handle might be normal, but a group of accounts switching
their names in rotation is unlikely to be coincidental.
In this paper we propose an approach that considers co-
ordination of multiple actors to reveal suspicious behav-
iors, regardless of their automated/organic nature and ma-
licious/benign intent. The idea is to use features extracted
from social media data to build a coordination network,
where two accounts have a strong tie if they display un-
expectedly similar behavioral traces. These similarities can
stem from any metadata, such as content entities and profile
features. Networks provide an efficient representation for
sparse similarity matrices, and a natural framework to detect
significant clusters of coordinated accounts. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed framework on Twitter, but
the method can in principle be applied to any social media
platform where data is available.
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After describing our methodology, we present five case
studies by instantiating the framework to detect different
types of coordination: (i) handle changes, (ii) image shar-
ing, (iii) sequential use of hashtags, (iv) co-retweets, and
(v) synchronization. These examples illustrate the general-
ity of our approach: we are able to detect coordinated cam-
paigns based on what is presented as identity, shown in pic-
tures, written in text, retweeted, or when these actions are
taken.
Methods
The proposed framework to detect accounts acting in coor-
dination on social media is illustrated in Fig. 1. It can be
described by four phases:
1. Behavioral trace extraction: The starting point of coor-
dination detection should be a conjecture about suspicious
behavior. Assuming that authentic users are somewhat in-
dependent of each other, we consider a surprising lack
of independence as evidence of coordination. The imple-
mentation of the framework is guided by a choice of traces
that capture such suspicious behavior. For example, if we
conjecture that accounts are controlled by an entity with
the goal of amplifying the exposure of a disinformation
source, we could extract shared URLs as traces. Coordi-
nation scenarios may be associated with a few broad cat-
egories of suspicious traces:
(a) If the coordination is based on the content being shared,
suspicious traces may include words, n-grams, hash-
tags, media, links, user mentions, etc.
(b) Coordination could be revealed by spatiotemporal pat-
terns of activity. Examples of traces that can reveal
suspicious behaviors are timestamps, places, and geo-
coordinates.
(c) Accounts could coordinate on the basis of personas or
groups. Traces of identity descriptors could be used to
detect these kinds of coordination: name, handle, pro-
file picture, homepage, account creation date, etc.
(d) The detection of coordination might require a combina-
tion of multiple dimensions. For instance, the number
of false positive cases could be reduced by a combina-
tion of hashtags and temporal signals.
2. Bipartite network construction: Once traces of interest
are identified, we can build a network of users based on
similar behavioral traces. The first step is to build a bipar-
tite network connecting accounts and features extracted
from their profiles and messages. In this phase, we may
use the behavioral traces as features, or engineer new fea-
tures derived from the traces. For example, content analy-
sis may yield features based on sentiment, stance, and nar-
rative frames. Temporal features such as hour-of-day and
day-of-week could be extrapolated from timestamp meta-
data. Features could be engineered by aggregating traces,
for example by conflating locations into countries or im-
ages into color profiles. More complex features could be
engineered by considering sets or sequences of traces. The
bipartite network may be weighted based on the strength
of association between an account and a feature — shar-
ing the same image many times is a stronger signal than
sharing it just once. Weights may also incorporate nor-
malization such as IDF to account for popular features;
it is not suspicious if many accounts mention the same
celebrity.
3. Projection onto account network: Depending on the
features, the bipartite network may be more or less sparse.
If the features are common, it may be useful to prune
some low-weight edges that provide noisy signals about
coordination among accounts — we cannot state with
confidence that an account tweeting twice has been co-
ordinating with anyone due to lack of data. At this stage,
the bipartite network is projected onto a network where
the account nodes are preserved, and edges are added be-
tween nodes based on some similarity measure over the
features. This may be done via simple co-occurrence, Jac-
card coefficient, cosine similarity, or more sophisticated
statistical metrics such as mutual information or χ2. The
edges in the resulting undirected network are weighted
by the similarity measure and reveal interaction patterns
among the accounts.
4. Cluster analysis: Low-weight edges in the account net-
work may be filtered out to focus on the most suspicious
interactions. One way to do this is to preserve edges with
weight above a threshold, another is to preserve some
top percentile of weights. More advanced methods like
multi-scaling backbone (Serrano, Boguna´, and Vespig-
nani 2009) can also be considered. The final step is to per-
form cluster analysis on the account network. Many net-
work community detection algorithms can be used, such
as connected components, k-core, k-cliques, modularity
maximization, and label propagation, among others (For-
tunato 2010). The clusters obtained in this final step rep-
resent groups of accounts whose actions are likely to be
coordinated.
We recommend a manual inspection of the suspicious
clusters and their content. Such analysis will provide valida-
tion of the method and evidence of whether the coordinated
groups are malicious and/or automated.
In the following section we present five case studies, in
which we implement the proposed framework to detect co-
ordination. First, we use a dataset of profiles submitted to a
social bot classifier to identify coordination based on shar-
ing identities. Then, we leverage a tweet dataset tracking the
2019 Hong Kong protests to detect content (images) coor-
dination. Third, we use a database of tweets related to the
2018 US midterm elections to uncover temporal-content co-
ordination from the usage of hashtags. Fourth, we look at
co-retweets in a dataset of content about the White Helmets.
And finally, we consider the synchronization of messages to
spot pump & dump schemes to manipulate cryptocurrencies.
Case Study 1: Account Handle Sharing
On Twitter and some other social media platforms, although
each user account has an immutable ID, many relation-
ships are based on an account handle (called screen name
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Figure 1: Coordination Detection Framework. On the left we see behavioral traces that can be extracted from social media
profiles and messages. Four steps described in the text lead to the identification of suspicious clusters of accounts.
on Twitter) that is changeable and in general reusable. An
exception is that handles of suspended accounts are not
reusable on Twitter. Users may have legitimate reasons for
changing handles. However, the possibility of changing and
reusing handles exposes users to abuse such as username
squatting1 and impersonation (Mariconti et al. 2017). In a re-
cent example, multiple Twitter handles associated with dif-
ferent personas were used by the same Twitter account to
spread the name of the Ukraine whistleblower in the US
presidential impeachment case.2
For a concrete example of how handle changes can be ex-
ploited, consider the following chronological events:
1. user 1 (named @super cat) follows user 2 (named
@kittie) who posts pictures of felines.
2. user 3 (named @super dog) post pictured of canines.
3. user 1 tweets mentioning user 2: ”I love @kittie”.
A mention on Twitter creates a link to the mentioned ac-
count profile. Therefore, at time step 3, user 1’s tweet
is linked to user 2’s profile page.
4. user 2 renames its handle to @tiger.
5. user 3 renames its handle to @kittie, reusing
user 2’s handle.
Even though user 1’s social network is unaltered
regardless of the name change (user 1 still follows
user 2), name changes are not reflected in previous posts,
so anyone who clicks on the link at step 3 will be redirected
to user 3’s profile instead of to user 2 as originally in-
tended by user 1. This type of user squatting, in coordi-
nation with multiple accounts, can be used to promote en-
1help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-username-
squatting
2www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-28/trump-
names-ukraine-whistle-blower-in-a-retweet-he-later-deleted
tities, run “follow-back” campaigns, infiltrate communities,
or even promote polarization (Mariconti et al. 2017). Since
social media posts are often indexed by search engines, these
manipulations can be used to promote content beyond social
media boundaries.
To detect this kind of coordination on Twitter, we ap-
plied our framework using identity traces, namely Twitter
handles. We started from a log of requests to Botometer
(botometer.org), a social bot detection service of the Indi-
ana University Observatory on Social Media (Yang et al.
2019). Each log record consists of a timestamp, the Twit-
ter user id and handle, and the bot score. For this case
study, we analyzed 54 million records from February 2017
to April 2019, containing 1.8 million unique accounts (each
with a distinct user id) and 1.9 million handles.
Coordination Detection
We create a bipartite network of suspicious handles and ac-
counts. We consider a handle suspicious if it is shared by
at least two accounts, and an account suspicious when it has
taken at least one suspicious handle. To detect the suspicious
groups we project the network, connecting accounts based
on the number of times they shared a handle.
Each connected component in the resulting network iden-
tifies a cluster of coordinated accounts as well as the set of
handles used by them.
Analysis
Fig. 2 shows the handle sharing network. It is a weighted,
undirected network with 7,879 nodes (Twitter accounts). We
can classify the components into three classes:
1. Star-like components capture the major accounts (hub
nodes) practicing name squatting and/or hijacking. To
confirm this, we analyzed the temporal sequence of han-
dle switches involving star-like components. Typically, a
Accounts: 54
Handles: 12
Avg. Degree: 12.37
Max. Switches: 22
Median Switches: 2.5
Accounts: 40
Handles: 10
Avg. Degree: 7.65
Max. Switches: 12
Median Switches: 2
Accounts: 6
Handles: 7
Avg. Degree: 3
Max. Switches: 6
Median Switches: 1
Accounts: 722
Handles: 181
Avg. Degree: 10.85
Max. Switches: 33
Median Switches: 2
Accounts: 397
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Avg. Degree: 2.01
Max. Switches: 4
Median Switches: 2
Figure 2: Handle sharing network. A node represents a Twitter account and its size is proportional to the number of accounts
with which it shares handles. The weight of an edge is the number of unique handles shared by two accounts. Suspicious
coordinated groups are identified by connected components, each with a different color. We illustrate the characteristics of a
few coordinated groups, namely the number of accounts, number of shared handles, average number of accounts with which
handles are shared, and the maximum and median number of times that a handle is switched among accounts. The number of
switches is a lower-bound estimate on the basis of our data sample. We also show tweets by independent parties who uncovered
the malicious activity of a couple of the coordinated groups, discussed in the main text.
handle switches from an account (presumably the victim)
to the hub, and later (presumably after some form of ran-
som is paid) it switches back from the hub to the origi-
nal account. These kinds of reciprocal switches occur 12
times more often in stars than any other components.
2. The giant component is composed by 722 accounts shar-
ing 181 names (orange group in the center of Fig. 2). Us-
ing the Louvain community detection algorithm (Blondel
et al. 2008), we can further divide the giant coponent into
13 sub-groups. We suspect they represent temporal clus-
ters corresponding to different coordinated campaigns by
the same group. This investigation is left for future study.
3. Other components can represent different cases requir-
ing further investigation, as discussed next.
Fig. 2 illustrates a couple of stories about malicious be-
haviors corresponding to two of the coordinated handle shar-
ing groups, which had previously been uncovered by others.
In June 2015, the handle @GullyMN49 was reported in the
news due to an offensive tweet against President Obama.3
More than one year later, the same handle was still posting
similar content.4 In March 2017, we observed 23 different
accounts taking the handle in a 5-day interval. We conjec-
3minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/06/03/obama-tweeter-says-
posts-cost-him-his-job-2/
4twitter.com/SwedJewFish/status/800946662386503680
ture that this may have been an attempt to keep the persona
created back in 2015 alive and evade suspension by Twit-
ter following reports of abuse to the platform. Currently, the
@GullyMN49 handle is banned but 21 of the accounts are
still active.
The second example in Fig. 2 shows a cluster of six
accounts sharing seven handles. They have all been sus-
pended since. Interestingly, the cluster was sharing handles
that appeared to belong to conflicting political groups, e.g.,
@ProTrumpMvmt and @AntiTrumpMvmt. Some of the
suspicious accounts kept changing sides over time. Further
investigation revealed that these accounts were heavily ac-
tive; they created the appearance of political fundraising
campaigns in an attempt to take money from both sides.
Fig. 3 shows the distributions of bot scores for the sus-
picious accounts identified by our analysis and an equally-
sized sample of non-suspicious accounts from the same
dataset. The two distributions can be discriminated by a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, showing that coordinated ac-
counts are more likely to have higher bot scores (p < 0.01).
However, most coordinated accounts have low (human-like)
scores. Moreover, Fig. 3 shows that as the coordination level
increases, the average bot score decreases. These results
highlight that in general, bot detection tools are not suffi-
cient to detect this kind of coordination.
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Figure 3: Bot scores of handle sharing accounts. Left:
Probability distributions of average bot scores for 6,061 co-
ordinated accounts and a sample of the same number of non-
suspicious accounts. The number derives from our use of
bot scores from the current version of Botometer, collected
since May 2018. The dataset may include multiple scores for
the same account. Right: Relationship between coordination
level (inferred from the size of connected components cor-
responding to coordination groups) and average bot score.
Logarithmic bins are used for component sizes. Error bars
are standard errors across bot score measurements in each
bin.
Case Study 2: Image Coordination
Images constitute a large portion of the content on social
media. A group of accounts posting many of the same or
similar images may reveal suspicious coordinated behavior.
In this case study, we identify such groups on Twitter in the
context of the 2019 Hong Kong protest movement by lever-
aging media images as content traces.
The dataset used in this case study was collected between
August 31 and September 30, 2019 using the BotSlayer tool
developed at the Indiana University Observatory on Social
Media (Hui et al. 2019). We focus on tweets that contain
one or more images, and remove all retweets to avoid trivial
replications of the same images. We further exclude users
who tweeted less than three images to minimize noise in the
network projection phase. The remaining 2,945 users gener-
ated 31,772 tweets with images.
Coordination Detection
Every time an image is posted, it is assigned a different URL.
Therefore detecting identical or similar images is not as sim-
ple as comparing URLs; it is necessary to analyze the actual
image content. We represent each image by its RGB color
histogram, binning each channel into 128 intervals and re-
sulting in a 384-dimensional vector. The binned histograms
allow for matching variants: images with the same vector are
either identical or similar, and correspond to the same fea-
ture. We then construct a bipartite network of accounts and
image features by linking accounts with the vectors of their
shared images. The network edges are weighted by their cor-
responding tweet frequencies.
We perform a projection of the bipartite network to obtain
a weighted account coordination network. The weights of
the edges can be derived from any similarity measure calcu-
lated using the bipartite network weights; in this case study
we adopt the Jaccard similarity.
We select the edges with the largest 1% of the weights
to focus on reliable coordination relations. Excluding the
singletons (accounts with insufficient evidence of coordina-
tion), we rank the connected components of the network by
size. Next, let us focus on the largest components.
Analysis
Fig. 4 shows the account coordination network. We iden-
tify three suspicious clusters involving 317 accounts, post-
ing pro- or anti-protest images. The anti-protest group shares
images with Chinese text, targeting Chinese-speaking audi-
ences, while the pro-protest group shares images with En-
glish text.
We observe that some of the shared image features corre-
spond to the exact same image, others are slight variants. For
example, the 59 image URLs corresponding to the same fea-
ture in the pro-protest cluster include slight variations with
different brightness and cropping. The same is true for 61
corresponding anti-protest images.
Although this method identifies coordination of accounts,
it does not characterize the coordination as malicious or be-
nign, nor as automated or organic. In fact, many of these
coordinated accounts behave like authentic users according
to Botometer (Yang et al. 2019). These groups are identified
because their constituent accounts have circulated the same
sets of pictorial content significantly more often than the rest
of the population.
Case Study 3: Hashtag Sequences
A key element of a disinformation campaign is an ample
audience to influence. To spread beyond one’s followers, a
malicious actor can use hashtags to target other users who
are interested in a topic and may search for related tweets.
If a set of automated accounts were to publish messages
using identical text, it would look suspicious and would be
easily detected by a platform’s anti-spam measures. To min-
imize the chances of detection, it is easy to imagine a ma-
licious user leveraging a language model (e.g., GPT-25) to
paraphrase their messages. Detection could become even
harder due to legitimate apps that publish paraphrased text
on behalf of a user. An example of this behavior is exhibited
by the “Backfire Trump” Twitter app, which tweets to Pres-
ident Trump whenever there is a fatality resulting from gun
violence.
However, we conjecture that even paraphrased text is
likely to include the same hashtags based on the targets of a
coordinated campaign. Therefore, in this case study we ex-
plore how to identify coordinated accounts that post highly
similar sequences of hashtags across multiple tweets.
We evaluated this approach on the dataset generated for
the Bot Electioneering Volume project (Yang, Hui, and
Menczer 2019). The dataset consist of tweets containing
election-related hashtags, collected using Twitter’s filtering
API between October and December 2018, around the U.S.
midterm election. Prior to applying our framework, we split
the dataset into daily intervals to detect when pairs of ac-
counts become coordinated. We filter out accounts with
fewer than five tweets or fewer than five unique hashtags.
5openai.com/blog/better-language-models/
Figure 4: Account coordination network about Hong Kong protest on Twitter. Nodes represent user accounts, whose sizes
are proportional to their degrees. If two nodes share any image in common, they are connected by an edge weighted by the
Jaccard similarity between their features. On the left-hand side, accounts are colored purple if they are in likely coordinated
groups, otherwise orange. On the right-hand side we focus on the connected components corresponding to the likely coordinated
groups. The three largest components are colored according to the content of their images — one pro- and two anti-protest
clusters, in blue and green respectively. We show some exemplar images shared by these groups, along with the corresponding
numbers of distinct URLs.
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Figure 5: Hashtag sequence features. Hashtags and their
positions are extracted from tweet metadata. Accounts
tweeting the same sequence of hashtags are easily identified.
Coordination Detection
The bipartite network in the first phase consists of accounts
in one layer and hashtag traces in the other. This graph is
transformed to extract our features of interest, consisting of
an ordered sequence of hashtags for each user (Fig. 5). In
practice, we can process these bipartite networks using one
of two approaches:
1. Any duplicate detection method, such as a dictionary
where the keys are ordered sequences of hashtags, al-
lows for accounts with identical sequences to be grouped
together, but will not match accounts with similar se-
quences.
2. A locality-sensitive hashing method, such as Min-
Hash (Broder 1997), allows us the flexibility to query sim-
ilar users based on the Jaccard similarity between sets of
hashtag n-grams.
The duplicate approach might cause us to miss some co-
ordinated accounts due to the arbitrary time cutoff, or occa-
sional mismatches. To construct the inputs for the MinHash
method,6 we use hashtag n-gram strings. We achieve similar
results using MinHash with a Jaccard similarity threshold
of 0.8 and using a duplicate method; in the following we
present results based on the latter.
To project each daily bipartite network onto a hashtag
coordination network, we draw an edge between two ac-
counts with matched hashtag sequences. We identify sus-
picious groups of accounts by removing singleton nodes
and then extracting the connected components of the net-
work. Large components are more suspicious, as it is less
likely that many accounts post the same hashtag sequences
by chance. Fig. 6 illustrates 32 suspicious groups identified
on a single day.
6github.com/ekzhu/datasketch
Florida, POTUS, BackfireTrump, Florida,
POTUS,BackfireTrump, Illinois, POTUS,
BackfireTrump, Missouri, POTUS,
BackfireTrump, Washington, POTUS,
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Tennessee, POTUS, BackfireTrump, Virginia,
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Facebook, America, DeepState,
Trump, Trump, Obama, Trump,
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MichaelAvenatti,
CreepyPornLawyer,
MichaelAvenatti, Texas, Trump,
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Figure 6: Hashtag coordination network. Accounts are represented as nodes, with edges connecting accounts that tweeted the
same sequences of hashtags. There are 32 connected components, identified by different colors. The hashtag sequences shared
by two of the coordinated groups (the smallest and largest) are shown. This network is based on tweets from October 22, 2018.
Analysis
Using our approach, we identified 617 daily instances of co-
ordination carried out by 1,809 unique accounts across the
3-month period. The largest coordinated group on a single
day consisted of 1,175 accounts — the largest component
shown in Fig. 6 is a subset of this group. The smallest group
consisted of just a pair of accounts.
We observe that many of the coordinated accounts hijack
hashtags to amplify their reach or use Twitter apps that tweet
on behalf of an account. The latter is the case of the largest
coordination group.
Given that coordination can occur over multiple groups
of accounts and that these groups can evolve over time, it
may be desirable to merge the daily networks to reveal more
complex types of coordination among different groups. One
could also use different time resolutions to build the net-
work; shorter intervals enable more matches but also in-
crease the noise, whereas longer intervals will yield fewer
matches and fewer false positives.
Case Study 4: Co-Retweets
Amplification of information sources is perhaps the most
common form of manipulation. On Twitter, a group of ac-
counts retweeting the same tweets or the same set of ac-
counts may signal coordinated behavior.
We apply the proposed framework to detect coordinated
accounts that amplify narratives related to the White Hel-
mets, a volunteer organisation that was targeted by disin-
formation campaigns during the civil war in Syria.7 The
anonymized dataset in this case study is provided by the
7www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/syria-white-
helmets-conspiracy-theories
DARPA SocialSim project; it includes over 800 thousand
retweets by approximately 42 thousand accounts, collected
between April 2018 and March 2019.
Coordination Detection
We construct the bipartite network between retweeting ac-
counts and retweeted messages, excluding self-retweets.
This network is weighted using TF-IDF to discount the con-
tributions of popular tweets. Each account is therefore rep-
resented as a TF-IDF vector of retweeted tweet IDs. The
projected co-retweet network is then weighted by the cosine
similarity between the account vectors. We finally apply two
filters: we retain edges with similarity above 0.9, and with
both accounts having at least ten retweets.
Analysis
Fig. 7 shows the co-retweet network, and highlights two
groups of coordinated accounts. Accounts in the green and
blue subgraphs retweet pro- and anti-White Helmets mes-
sages, respectively. The example tweets shown in the figure
are no longer publicly available.
Case Study 5: Synchronized Action
“Pump & dump” is a shady scheme where the price of
a stock is inflated by simulating a surge in buyer interest
through false statements (pump) to sell the cheaply pur-
chased stock at a higher price (dump). Investors are vulner-
able to this kind of manipulation because they want to act
quickly when acquiring stocks that seem to promise high fu-
ture profits. By exposing investors to information seemingly
from different sources in a short period of time, fraudsters
create a false sense of urgency that prompts victims to act.
Figure 7: Co-retweet network. Two connected components
are highlighted with exemplar retweets. Singleton nodes are
omitted.
Social media provide fertile ground for this type of
scam (Mirtaheri et al. 2019). We investigate the effective-
ness of our framework in detecting coordinated cryptocur-
rency pump & dump campaigns on Twitter. Our analysis
leverages an anonymized dataset provided by the DARPA
SocialSim project; it includes 3.2 million posts by approx-
imately 900 thousand accounts, collected between January
2017 and January 2019. Here we treat tweets and retweets
the same since they all add to the stream of information con-
sidered by potential buyers.
Coordination Detection
We hypothesize that coordinated pump & dump campaigns
use software to have multiple accounts post pump messages
in close temporal proximity. We therefore use tweet times-
tamps as the behavioral traces of the accounts. These are
binned into 30-minute time intervals to obtain features, used
to construct the bipartite network of accounts and tweet
times. Edges are weighted using TF-IDF. Similar to the pre-
vious case, the projected account coordination network is
therefore weighted by the cosine similarity between the TF-
IDF vectors. We only keep edges with both nodes producing
at least three messages and a cosine similarity above 0.9.
Analysis
Fig. 8 shows the synchronized action network. The green
subgraphs flag suspicious pump & dump schemes pushing
the Indorse Token cryptocurrency, and the blue subgraph
corresponds to accounts pumping Bitcoin. Tweet excerpts
allegedly state that the accounts have access to business in-
telligence and hint at the potential rise in coin price. The
tweets shown in the figure are no longer publicly available.
We observe other dense clusters in Fig. 8. Inspection re-
veals that these groups are composed of spam accounts —
although they are not examples of pump & dump schemes,
they do flag coordinated manipulation.
Discussion
The five case studies presented in this paper are merely il-
lustrations of how our proposed framework can be imple-
mented to find coordination. While our examples are based
on Twitter, the framework can in principle be applied to
other social media platforms, such as Facebook and Insta-
gram, using any behavioral traces in the data. For instance,
the image coordination method can be applied on Instagram,
and coordination among Facebook pages can be discovered
via the content they share.
While our framework is very general, each implemen-
tation involves design decisions and related parameter set-
tings. For example, in our case studies, suspicious groups
are identified by simply considering connected components
in the account coordination network. This may suffice if the
network is sparse, whereas additional filtering (e.g., k-core
or clique discovery) may help obtain better results in denser
networks.
Our framework aims to identify coordination among user
accounts, but it does not characterize the intent or authen-
ticity of the coordination. In some cases, traces and features
may be chosen to target specific suspicious behaviors. For
example, it is reasonable to assume that large groups of ac-
counts sharing handles have malicious intent. In other cases,
coordinated campaigns may be carried out by authentic (hu-
man) users with benign intent. For instance, social move-
ment participants use hashtags in a coordinated fashion to
raise awareness of their causes.
It is important to minimize false positive errors — spon-
taneous, organic collective behaviors that may appear as co-
ordinated. For instance, false positives would result by con-
sidering identical messages generated by social media share
buttons on news websites. Such content similarity alone
does not constitute evidence of coordination.
While we use filters based on link weights, feature sup-
port, and component size in our case studies, more rigorous
and general methods are needed to exclude spurious links
that can be attributed to chance. One approach we plan to
explore in future work is to design null models for the ob-
served behaviors, which in turn would enable a statistical
test to identify meaningful coordination links. For example,
one could apply Monte Carlo shuffling of the bipartite net-
work before projection to calculate the p-values associated
with each similarity link.
Each of our case studies explores a single behavior in
a distinct context. One may wish to consider multiple di-
mensions of coordination in a single scenario. This would
present the challenge of representing interactions through
multiplex networks, and/or combining different similarity
measures.
Related Work
Academic efforts to detect social bots on social media have
been a topic of research since at least 2012. At that time,
a platform was developed with the goal of crowd-sourcing
their detection (Wang et al. 2012). However, the low cost
of deploying social bots meant that automated approaches
had to be developed to keep pace with the ever-increasing
amount of bots. This led to the development of machine
learning models, initially based on the supervised learn-
ing paradigm. These models require the use of labeled data
describing how both humans and bots behave. Given the
Figure 8: Time coordination network. Nodes represent accounts, and two nodes are connected if they post or retweet within
the same 30-minute periods. Singletons and dyads are omitted. Four connected components are highlighted with excerpts of a
few exemplar suspicious retweets.
lack of ground truth data, researchers created datasets us-
ing automated honeypot methods (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee
2011), human annotation (Varol et al. 2017), or identified
suspicious groups of accounts that seemed to be botnets
(Echeverria, Besel, and Zhou 2017; Echeverria and Zhou
2017). These datasets have proven to be a good approx-
imation of ground truth, upon which successful detection
tools have been built (Davis et al. 2016; Varol et al. 2017;
Yang et al. 2019).
One downside of supervised detection methods is that by
relying on features from a single account or tweet, they are
not as effective at detecting coordinated social bots (Chen
and Subramanian 2018; Cresci et al. 2017; Grimme, As-
senmacher, and Adam 2018). The detection of coordinated
accounts requires a shift toward the unsupervised learning
paradigm. Initial applications focused on clustering or com-
munity detection algorithms in an attempt to identify simi-
lar features among pairs of accounts (Ahmed and Abulaish
2013; Miller et al. 2014). Recent applications look at spe-
cific coordination dimensions, such as content or time (Al-
khateeb and Agarwal 2019). A method named Digital DNA
proposed to encode the tweet type or content as a string,
which was then used to identify the longest common sub-
string between accounts (Cresci et al. 2016). Debot is a
time-based method that compares the time series of accounts
with the purpose of identifying accounts that tweet in syn-
chrony (Chavoshi, Hamooni, and Mueen 2016). A content-
based method proposed by Chen and Subramanian (2018)
searches for accounts tweeting similar content. While these
approaches work well, they have the disadvantage of con-
sidering only one of the many possible coordination dimen-
sions, some of which in the worst-case scenario requires the
comparison of a quadratic number of accounts.
The framework proposed here is also unsupervised, but
more general in allowing multiple similarity criteria. The
quadratic complexity problem is mitigated by imposing
sparse network representations for the bipartite relationships
between accounts and traces, and consequently the derived
feature and projection networks.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a network framework to iden-
tify coordinated accounts on social media. We presented five
case studies demonstrating that our framework can be ap-
plied to detect multiple types of coordination on Twitter.
Unlike supervised methods that evaluate the features of
individual accounts to estimate the likelihood that an ac-
count belongs to some class, say a bot or troll, the objec-
tive of our framework is to detect coordinated behaviors at
the group level. Therefore, the proposal is intended to com-
plement rather than replace individual-level approaches to
counter social media manipulation.
The proposed framework provides a unified way of tack-
ling the detection of coordinated campaigns on social media.
As such, it may help advance research in this area by high-
lighting the similarities and differences between approaches.
We hope that this work will shed light on new techniques
that social media companies may use to combat malicious
actors, and also empower the general public to become more
aware of the threats of modern information ecosystems.
As part of our future work, we intend to incorporate this
framework onto BotSlayer (Hui et al. 2019). We believe that
the flexibility afforded by this framework, along with the
user-friendliness of BotSlayer, will enable an ample audi-
ence of users to join our efforts to counter dis- and mis-
information on social media.
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